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Since the 15th century, Western Europeans had been coming to 
Russia in ever-larger numbers to do battle for Muscovy, to trade, 
or to serve the tsar at court or in his administration. In the first half 
of the 17th century, in the decades following the Time of Troubles, 
as the state embarked on a substantial, Western-inspired reform 
ofthe military and the economy rebounded and diversified, the 
flow o f Europeans g rew stronger and the alien resident popula­
tion mushroomed, especially in Moscow, the heart ofthe realm.1 
As wary as it might have been about allowing growing numbers 
of foreigners to settle in the country, the Muscovite state ultimately 
welcomed their presence and even facilitated it through various 
incentives. It is clear that those formulating state policy believed
1 One estimate places the Lutheran/Calvinist foreign population in Moscow 
at one thousand men, not including their families, in the 1630s. A more com­
plete figure, counting Anglicans, Catholics, and possibly others is unavail­
able, as is a total for those foreigners who resided in the provinces, many 
of them in the tsar’s military. The latter alone appear to have numbered 
some several thousand by the end ofthe 16th century. See Tsvetaev, Pro- 
testantstvo, 246-250; and Baron, “Moscow’s Nemeckqja Sloboda,” 2.
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that the potential risks—to national security, popular order and 
morality, and Church-state relations—associated with allowing 
foreigners to live in Russia among Russians and to enter and exit 
the country on business were outweighed bythe benefits they 
brought with them: specie for a treasury totally dependent on 
outside sources; capital, entrepreneurial skills and techniques; 
and commercial networks that could help stimulate Russian trade, 
boost customs revenues, provide technological know-how in 
developing new products, mining, metallurgy and weapons manu­
facture, military skills and manpower, scientific knowledge, lan­
guages, etc.2 Sustained Muscovite awareness o f Russia’s short­
comings in these areas and its need to improve if it were to in­
crease its strength geopolitically (versus Poland and Sweden in 
the west and the Ottomans in the south) fueled the “first” wave 
(i.e., pre-Petrine) of Western European migration to Russia.
Muscovy was not alone in recognizing that foreigners could 
make important contributions to its state power. The world over, 
throughout the ages, from Europe to Asia, rulers have sought to 
use outsiders to better promote their interests. In return, they have 
granted these strangers rewards to anchor and nurture the relation­
ship. Beyond remuneration and other material incentives, those 
who lived and worked in foreign lands were most concerned 
about two core issues. First, how, by whom, and according to which 
law they would be judged in disputes, and second, the extent to 
which they could practice their religious beliefs—concerns essen­
tially about the safety of body and soul. On the question of reli­
gious liberty, in the 16th and 17th centuries, the policies adopted in 
various settings showa clear dichotomy between East and West, 
with Ottoman, Mughal, and Southeast Asian rulers displaying a 
more accommodating inclination, while Western European states 
generally exhibited a rigid, often aggressive drive towards uni­
formity in the religious sphere.
The Muscovite stance on the issue vis-a-vis Western Euro­
peans can be situated somewhere in the middle of this spectrum, 
less liberal than the Eastern model, but considerably more tolerant 
than was the norm in the West in the period. Although the latter
2 Some useful discussions and assessments ofthe role of Western Euro­
peans in Muscovite Russia are provided by: Lappo-Danilveskii, “Inozem- 
tsy”; Pypin, “Inozemtsy”; Tsvetaev, Protestantstvo; Muliukin, Priezd ino- 
strantsev, Platonov, Moskva izapad; Esper, “ Military Self-Sufficiency”; 
Phipps, Britons; and Fuhrmann, Capitalism in Russia.
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point is not entirely new, it has not been the subject o f much 
reflection, and certainly not o f any broad comparative discussion. 
Rather, it has been buried under numerous, often disparaging 
depictions of Muscovy, by contemporaries and scholars alike, as a 
den of xenophobia. While not denying that 16th- and 17th-century 
Muscovites were ethnocentric, probably xenophobic (atleastin 
the decades following the Time of Troubles, when the scars left by 
invading Polish Catholic and Protestant Swedish armies and the 
Polish occupation of Moscow had yet to fade), this study shifts the 
analysis away from popular attitudes that are difficult to trace, to 
state policies, which are not only more accessible to the historian, 
but also the single most important force in setting the parameters 
o f religious expression and practice forforeign communities in 
Russia. These parameters were relatively wide because the parti­
cular ethno-cultural space that made up early modern Russia and 
the perceptions that formed around it, coupled with the exigen­
cies of state building in an imperial setting combined to favor a 
pragmatic and flexible approach to the religious question.
Ethnocentrism and Xenophobia: Muscovite and Other
You strangers that inhabit this land!
Note this same writing, do it understand;
Conceive it well, for safety of your lives,
Your goods, your children, and your dearest wives.
One can well imagine the chilling effect these non-too-subtle 
threats must have had on those who first sawthem affixed one 
morning to the front gate o f their church, back in the early 1590s. 
The place was not Moscow, but London, and the church be­
longed to a Dutch parish, by far the largest resident alien com­
munity in the English capital at the time. London was also home in 
this period to a sizeable French community, which, like the Dutch, 
was often the target of insult and abuse, including daily harass­
ment in the streets, at the hands ofthe English. The Archbishop of 
Canterbury bemoaned the behavior of his flock, lamenting Lon­
doners’ habit of referring to resident Frenchmen and their kin as 
“French dogs,” while another contemporary rebuked his fellows 
for the “inveterate fierceness and cankered malice” they held for 
foreigners living in their midst.4 Blunt warnings of violence, verbal
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3 Yungblut, Strangers, 42.
4 Yungblut, Strangers, 12, 43-44.
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harassment, and dishonest business tactics aimed at hurting the 
livelihood of those not English were common occurrences in the 
daily lives of resident aliens in Elizabethan England. In the early 
17th century, the situation was not much improved, the chaplain of 
the Venetian ambassador in London observing that foreigners 
were well-advised “to avoid strangeness in dress” lest they fall 
prey to the hostility of officials and tradesmen who were “apt to ill- 
treat and rob them.”5
By the time the good chaplain penned his remarks, the English 
had long been perceived by their continental brethren as ethno­
centric, prone to flaunting their superiority vis-a-vis other peoples 
and states, sometimes veering into outrightxenophobia. For­
eigners commented “with almost monotonous regularity” on the 
intense English dislike of outsiders, describing them as “inimical to 
strangers,” “great lovers of themselves... [who believe] that there 
[is] no people equal to them and no other world but England.” One 
Italian observer noted disapprovingly that “they have an antipathy 
of foreigners and imagine they never come into their island but to 
make themselves masters o f it, and to usurp theirgoods.”6 No 
doubt, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Austrians, Venetians, Florentines, 
Dutchmen, and other Europeans displayed theirown brands of 
self-satisfaction and insularity, viewing themselves in the most 
shining of lights, while looking down on others with distaste rang­
ing from mild condescension to suspicious hostility.
So, apparently, did the Muscovites. While 19th- and early 20th- 
century anthropologists and sociologists were honing their under­
standing and definition of “ethnocentrism” and “xenophobia,” his­
torians o f Russia were busy writing about, among other related 
topics, the negative attitude of Muscovites towards foreigners and 
all things foreign. In the works of these scholars, Russia in the 16th 
and 17th centuries was depicted as a place where people at all 
levels of society were “wary” and “suspicious” of foreigners, “into­
lerant” o f the non-Russian and non-Orthodox, “unwelcoming,” 
“highly distrustful,” and even “hostile” to anything or anyone from 
“the outside.” Russians supposedly “hated” foreigners, whom 
they sometimes referred to as “dogs” or “snakes,” refusing to 
have any physical contact with them o rto  entertheir homes.7
5 Yungblut, Strangers, 47.
6 Pettegree, Foreign Protestant Communities, 1; and Yungblut, Strangers, 
47.
7 See, for instance, Pypin, “Inozemtsy,” 55-256; Tsvetaev, Protestantstvo, 
329-334,341; and Liubimenko, Istoriia torgovykh snoshenii, 62-63,131.
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Foreign visitors to Russia in the period provided much o fthe  
material for these assessments. Sixteenth-century accounts, for 
instance those penned by Ulfeldt (1575) or Possevino (1586), con­
tain many references to Muscovites shunning contact with for­
eigners. Similar observations were made in subsequentworks as 
late as the turn ofthe 18th century. Petrejus, writing in 1615, noted 
the “ pride” o fth e  Muscovites and the low view they held o f 
“others,” while a few decades later, Olearius described a people 
that regarded itself as superior.8
Foreigners who described Muscovites as self-important, 
proud, and contemptuous of others attributed these sentiments to 
a sense of religious superiority: the belief, in fact ardent conviction, 
that Orthodoxy was the one true faith and its adherents the only 
real Christians. Catholics were, at best, “besprinkled Christians” 
and, at worst, along with everyone else who was not Orthodox 
(Protestants, Muslims, Jews, and non-Christians) “unclean” and 
“sinful,” “heretics” or “heathens.” According to certain observers, 
Muscovites were especially scornful and intolerant of Catholics, 
which some believed stemmed from the influence of the Byzan­
tine/Greek Orthodox tradition,9 as well as Jews, whom the Russian 
clergy referred to as the “killers ofChrist.”10 Historians have 
observed that, forMuscovites, being Russian was synonymous 
with being Orthodox. One could not be of another faith, whether 
Christian or non-Christian, and be Russian. Command ofthe Rus­
sian language, the wearing of Russian dress, a physiognomy simi­
lar to that of Russians, or even an oath of loyalty to the tsar—none 
were sufficient to “make” one a Russian, only adherence to the 
Russian Orthodox religion.11 Conversely, a person of non-Russian 
origin or physiognomy who barely spoke Russian or did so poorly, 
was considered Russian if he/she was Russian Orthodox, even if 
only in name. If ethnocentrism “is really the sentiment of patriotism 
in all its philosophic fullness... in both its rationality and its extrava­
gant exaggeration,”12 then, by believing and declaring their reli­
gion to be “the best,” Muscovites were simply being patriotic, 
waving the flag, so to speak. Pride in the Orthodox faith and,
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8 Poe, “Born to Slavery," 46; Petrejus, discussed in Birgegard, Sparwen- 
feld’s Diary, 264; and Baron, Travels o f Olearius, 232.
9 Fletcher, Russe Commonwealth, 94.
10 Poe, “Born to Slavery,” 46; Baron, Travels o f Olearius, 277,282; and 
Dunning, Grand Duchy, 123.
11 Tsvetaev, Protestantstvo, 341; and Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors, 42-43 .
12 Sumner, War, 12.
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conversely, the belittling o f other religions, was for Russians in the 
16th and 17th centuries pride in Russia, in being Russian, and in 
being the subjects ofthe mighty Russian tsar, even if these sen­
timents were not articulated or even perceived as such.
In a recent discussion of Russian attitudes towards foreigners 
in the early modern period, Lindsey Hughes correctly, and refresh­
ingly, cautioned that the negative Russian perception of outsiders 
needs “to be viewed in a comparative perspective.” As I have 
done here, Hughes also used the case o fthe  English, usually 
depicted as a sensible and progressive-minded people, to make 
her point. “Englishness,” in this era, was suffused with xenopho­
bia, hatred of Catholics, the Scots and the French, displaying, as 
Linda Colley has brilliantly revealed, “a vast superstructure of pre­
judice.”13 So what do we make ofthe Muscovites, the English, and 
others so fond of themselves? It seems that we should not be too 
harsh in our assessment, however offended our modern sensibi­
lities might be by such overt displays of cultural smugness. The 
work of sociobiologists has persuasively shown that ethnocentric 
tendencies, prejudices, and xenophobia appear to be universal. 
They occur to some degree or another in all cultures, although the 
specific content and articulation of these attitudes differs from one 
group to another and within the same group overtime, depending 
on socio-economic and political circumstances. Simply put, they 
are an expression ofthe age-old human striving for “group iden­
tity,” for “belonging to a group which accepts us as individuals, 
takes care of us, and protects us,” in a word, promotes our “survi­
val.”14 Moreover, the need to view the world in terms of “us” and 
“them” is strongly rooted in all cultures not only because of its in­
herent nature, but also because such attitudes, while easily 
learned (beginning in childhood), are very difficult to unlearn.15
Historians have developed a similar understanding of popular 
perceptions of self and “other.” In an insightful piece on religious 
intolerance in Reformation Germany, for instance, Robert W. Scrib­
ner discussed the universality of stereotypes or social labels, which 
are “continually being formed, modified, forgotten, revived, revised, 
and discarded” within any society, serving as a “cultural fund to be 
drawn upon ... available for mobilization at any given moment”16
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13 Cited in Hughes, “Foreigners,” 17.
14 Flohr, “Social Prejudices,” 197-200.
15 Reynolds, Falger, and Vine, “Conclusion,” 270,
16 Scribner, “Preconditions,” 44-45.
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The key word here is “mobilization” : the notion that prejudices, 
xenophobic perceptions, and tendencies present in all cultures 
can be activated, brought out of mumbled obscurity into the glaring 
blaze of daylight and articulate expressions, sometimes violent, of 
hatred and intolerance. History has shown that often, the mobili­
zing agent or trigger is economic stress in the guise of a real or 
perceived shortage or unequal distribution of essential resources 
(food, land, housing, or employment).17 The case of England is in­
structive once again. A recent study shows that almost every de­
cade of Elizabeth I’s economically challenged reign saw “actual or 
planned attacks” on foreigners in various parts ofthe English realm, 
and with increasing frequency.18 Particularly serious attacks took 
place in the first half of the 1590s in London. Merchants and trades­
people incensed with the government’s refusal to meet their de­
mands concerning foreign competition issued highly inflammatory 
pamphlets against the resident foreigners, the “beastly brutes the 
Belgians,” “drunken drones and faint-hearted Flemings,” “fraudu­
lent... Frenchmen,” all “treacherous serpents ... [who] sting [the 
English] to the very harte.” Fighting words were accompanied by 
riots and the looting o fthe  homes and businesses of those for­
eigners that heeded the warnings to leave England or else suffer 
the consequences.19 As elsewhere in conditions o f economic 
hardship and uncertainty, frustrations were assuaged and the in­
comprehensible understood by pointing an accusing finger or a 
hard fist at outsiders.
Religious Toleration in Muscovy
Fundamental concerns about physical sustenance and security 
setoffstridentvocalizationsand overtactsofpopularantipathy 
towards foreigners in early modern England. The religious issue 
exacerbated the situation. In an environment where people’s 
core beliefs and allegiances were shaken to the bone by deep 
and widespread religious strife brought on by the Reformation, 
the position o f outsiders in England and other parts o f Europe 
was made more difficult if they had the misfortune to adhere to a
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17 Flohr, “Social Prejudices,” 213. Studies suggest that an equitable distribu­
tion of resources would work against racism and violence between groups. 
Reynolds, Falger, and Vine, “Conclusion,” 271.
19 Yungblut, Strangers, 41-44.
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religion or church other than that of their host ruler and society- 
even worse if that affiliation was associated with an enemy power. 
The latter point underlines the important role played by the ruler 
or state, as opposed to society at large, on issues of faith in the 
age o f confession. Cuius regio, eius religio (“whose realm, his 
religion”) was the mantra of the moment and, as Scribner rightly 
observed, it was above all “the conjuncture o f politics and reli­
gious fervour” that was “fateful for the development o f intole­
rance.”20 For stranger communities in Europe, popular attitudes 
towards Catholics, Protestants and sectarians, Jews, Armenian 
Christians, or Ottoman Muslims for that matter, certainly made 
themselves felt in day-to-day encounters. However, policies ema­
nating from the top ultimately had the most decisive and dele­
terious impact on the religious life of outsiders.
While Muscovy certainly experienced tumultuous upheavals 
and catastrophes—natural and man-made—in the same period, it 
was spared the tribulations of the Reformation. This is not to say 
that the religious turmoil generated by the bitter struggle between 
Catholics and Protestants did not seep into Russia at all. In fact, it 
did from neighboring Poland, the ancient foe, where the Counter­
Reformation, aggressively advanced by the Jesuits, was aimed 
not only against Protestants, but also the Orthodox co-religionists 
o fthe  Muscovites, most disturbingly the East Slavic popula­
tions (Ukrainians and Belarusians) o fthe contested borderland 
region. In the first two decades o f the 17th century, during the 
Time o f Troubles, the Catholic threat emanating from Poland 
assumed its most menacing form in the guise o fthe  invading 
armies ofthe False Dmitrii and his Polish supporters and, later, of 
the Polish monarch himself, Sigismund III, intent on placing his son 
W+adys+aw on the Russian throne. Both attacks were launched 
with the blessings ofthe Jesuits, whose proselytizing aspirations 
at this time included a missio moscovitico (“Moscow mission”), 
which they explicitly hoped to prosecute in conjunction with 
Polish military enterprises, prompting one recent study o fthe  
subject to observe that the interests ofthe Jesuits and the ruling 
house of Poland “were so closely identified that they were in fact 
inseparable.”21 The Russians ultimately rallied, regained Moscow 
from the Polish occupiers, installed a new ruler and dynasty 
(Michael Romanov, 1613-1645), and began the painful process of
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reconstruction. The ominous shadow of Catholicism, however, 
continued to hover in the Ukrainian/Belarusian borderlands con­
trolled by Poland, as well as in Smolensk, seized from Russia by 
the Poles during the Time of Troubles. There the Jesuits lost no 
time in founding a mission (1611; elevated to a collegium in 1622) 
that sought to convert the local population.22
Despite clashes with Catholic forces, Western Europeans who 
chose to make Russia their home in the 16th and first half of the 
17th centuries generally found themselves in a remarkably accom­
modating religious environment compared to what they knew in 
their native lands. Official Muscovite toleration of religions other 
than Orthodoxy, Christian or not, practiced by non-Russian groups 
living under the tsar’s sway was striking. Even those who had little 
praise for the Russians, their rulers, or their culture expressed 
pleasant bafflement at this odd Russian openness. Olearius, who 
was far from generous in his appreciation o f Muscovite culture, 
could not deny that they “allow freedom of conscience to every­
one, even their subjects and slaves” and “tolerat[ed] and [had] 
dealings with people of other nations and religions, Lutherans, 
Calvinists, Armenians, Tatars, Persians, Turks,” although he was 
quick to add that, nevertheless, they were “very intolerant” of 
Catholics and Jews.23 Margeret, generally more favorable in his 
assessments of Russia and Russians, was more specific in his treat­
ment of this subject, and more direct. According to Margeret, in 
Muscovy, everyone enjoyed “freedom of conscience” and could 
“exercise their religious devotion publicly, except Roman Catho­
lics.” The Frenchman could hardly mask his amazement in des­
cribing how:
Even Tatars, Turks, and Persians, besides the Mordvinians and 
other Mohammedan peoples, are found under the domination 
ofthe Russians, each retaining their own religion. There are also 
Siberians, Lapps, and others who are neither Christian nor Mo­
hammedan, but rather worship certain animals according to their 
fancy without being forced into [the Russian] religion.
The picture painted by Margeret is not a totally accurate re­
flection of Muscovite policytowards non-Christian groups under 
Russian rule, but not too far off the mark. The Muslim populations
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ofthe  former Khanates o f Kazan and Astrakhan, conquered by 
Ivan IV in the mid-16th century, witnessed the destruction of their 
mosques and the erection o f Orthodox churches in their places 
soon after their defeats; prisoners in Russian custody were forci­
bly converted to Orthodoxy. Priests were sent out from the Rus­
sian heartland on a conversion mission, which was carried out 
through “intimidation, force, and the revocation of traditional privi­
leges,” as well as material incentives, depending on circumstances, 
efforts becoming more systematic in the course ofthe 17th cen­
tury.25 In the far north and Siberia, however, where there was no 
psychological or strategic need to demonstrate the “political and 
ideological supremacy of Orthodox Muscovy overformer Muslim 
overlords” and security concerns were minor, unlike along the 
steppe frontier,26 the state not only left the local religions un­
molested, but repeatedly instructed officials “not to baptize any 
foreigners by force” and not to offend their religious sensibilities. In 
this part o f the expanding empire, at least in the Muscovite era, 
practical considerations prevailed, the “unbaptized” population of 
the region providing valuable revenue for the state in the form of 
fur tribute, or iasak. Those who converted to Orthodoxy were re­
garded as Russian, and thus not subject to tribute.27
Western Europeans who settled in Muscovy were also left 
largely unmolested in matters of faith. They were free to hold their 
own religious views and worship according to their own customs 
and rites. Under Ivan IV in the latter half o fthe  16th century, the 
number o f foreigners swelled, many recruited by the tsar, and 
thousands more were captured during the Livonian War and 
forced to resettle in Moscow and beyond.28 The large foreign 
influx prompted a clarification o fth e  type o f worship permitted. 
According to one foreign observer at the time, Catholics and Pro­
testants were required to worship in their own languages and be­
hind closed doors only, presumably, so that Russians would not 
hear and see the other religions and be corrupted or lured away 
from Orthodoxy. Furthermore, the foreigners were strictly enjoined
25 Khodarkovsky, “Conversion,” 120-125. For a vivid contemporary des­
cription of the treatment of Tatar prisoners, see Fletcher, Russe Com­
monwealth, 94.
26 Khodarkovsky, “Conversion,” 120; and Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe 
Frontier, 223.
27 Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors, 43.
28 Tsvetaev, Protestantstvo, 29-45.
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to refrain from proselytizing among the tsar’s subjects.29 The de­
gree to which Europeans could practice their faith freely in Mus­
covy depended, to a large extent, on whether they were Catholic 
or Protestant. As several foreign accounts ofthe period record, 
although Catholics were permitted to work and live in Russia, they 
were not allowed to worship publicly, since the establishment of 
Catholic churches was forbidden. Catholics were thus restricted to 
private worship.30 Presumably some had private chapels at home, 
which, as far as can be ascertained, were not banned. There was 
a ban, though, on the importation of calendars and crucifixes from 
abroad, at least in the late 1630s, which must have impinged 
somewhat on Catholic worship.31 More importantly, Catholics in 
Russia were sometimes deprived of their priests. According to 
one source, while Patriarch Filaret co-ruled (1619-1633) during the 
reign of his son Tsar Michael (1613-1645), Catholics were not per­
mitted to keep priests in their employ. Towards the end of Filaret’s 
life, however, in 1630, a Russo-French commercial treaty granted 
French merchants the right to have and employ Catholic priests 
in their homes32
To have allowed resident Catholics in Muscovy to assemble 
in large gatherings in churches headed by priests, perhaps Jesuits 
potentially sympathetic to Polish interests, would certainly have 
been generous, but conceivably risky from a security standpoint. 
In an era when religion and politics were inextricably intertwined, 
the suspicion and caution displayed by the Muscovite state vis-a- 
vis Catholics was not exaggerated, rather quite typical, and even re­
strained compared to actions taken in other settings “threatened” 
by Catholicism, for instance England and the United Provinces. 
What ultimately matters is the Muscovite perception atthe time, 
whether accurate or not, and this perception was one of suspicion, 
especially in the decades following the Time of Troubles, during 
which Poles played no small part in wreaking havoc and destruc­
tion in Russia for over a decade, subsequently threatening the 
newly installed Romanov dynasty by refusing to give up Polish
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claims to the Muscovite throne. If we add to this the age-old animo­
sity between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, exacerbated by aggres­
sive proselytizing efforts by Jesuits and Polish-Lithuanian clerics 
among Orthodox populations under their control (in modern-day 
Ukraine and Belarus as well as Smolensk), which were disturbing, 
to say the least, to the Russian Orthodox Church, the result is a 
potent recipe for anti-Catholicism among Muscovite state and 
church hierarchs that could not but impact negatively somehow 
on Catholics in Russia. That it did not impact more forcefully is 
what is truly striking, particularly in the 1620s and early 1630s, 
when Patriarch Filaret (Tsar Michael’s father), who had spent seve­
ral years in Polish captivity and was therefore particularly hostile to 
Poles and Catholics, was the de facto ruler of Russia.33 Despite his 
personal feelings and the traditional antipathy ofthe church he 
headed to all things Catholic, Filaret, in his capacity as secular ruler, 
ultimately adhered to the Muscovite tradition of tolerating Catholi­
cism within Russia, albeit cautiously, to further state interests. Thus, 
although he initially prohibited Catholics from keeping priests in 
their homes, he relented in 1630 to secure a Russo-French com­
mercial treaty on the eve of Russo-Polish Smolensk War (1632­
1634), when Russia was courting French support against Poland. 
In 1628, he had also banned the use of Russian house servants 
by foreigners, Catholics and Protestants alike, allegedly because 
they prevented their Russian domestics from practicing their 
religion properly; it was difficult for Russians in foreign employ to 
observe the Orthodox fasts and feasts. However, when Charles I of 
England—still regarded as a potential ally against Poland, or at 
least, a source of some financial or military support—asked that his 
subjects, the merchants o fthe Muscovy Company, be exempted 
from the ban for convenience’s sake, he was not denied, and 
neither were various Western Europeans who petitioned for 
exemption.34 Apparently, the contributions Europeans could make 
to Muscovy, real or imagined, were more important than the risks 
to the eternal salvation of Muscovite domestics.
For Protestants, the parameters o f religious freedom in Russia 
were considerably broader. Under Ivan IV, Protestants were per­
mitted to erect a church (1575-1576) and practicetheirfaith publicly
33 For more on Filaret see Keep, “Filaret.”
34 Baron, “Moscow’s Nemeckaja Sloboda,” 7; and Szeftel, “Foreign Mer­
chants,” 348-349.
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(although invisibly, “behind closed doors”). In an unsurprising out- 
burstfrom Ivan IV against this Moscow community in 1580-1581 
(who was not attacked by the hypersensitive tsar in these years?!) 
the Protestant church was demolished, but a new one went up 
under Boris Godunov (1601) to serve the needs ofthe  growing 
number ofWestern Europeans coming to Russia to enterthetsar’s 
service, a trend that continued throughout the 17th century. This 
second church was razed by the supporters ofthe second False 
Dmitrii during the Time of Troubles (1610), but was restored by 1620 
and enlarged in subsequent years, serving Protestants of all pro­
fessions, nationalities, and stripes: Lutherans, Anglicans, Calvinists; 
Germans, Dutch, English, Scots, Irish; doctors, apothecaries, crafts­
men, military men, and merchants. Fire, the bane of Russian cities, 
destroyed the church in 1626. However, it was soon resurrected 
as the “Church of the New Foreigners” or “Officers Church.” In 
1629 the same section o fthe  city (Belyi Gorod) saw the estab­
lishment of a separate Calvinist church referred to as the “Dutch 
Church,” and later, an additional small chapel. Because ofthe 
large concentration o f English merchants residing in Vologda, 
one ofthe main trading posts along the Moscow-Archangel route, 
the Muscovy Company had a church attached to its enormous 
commercial yard there. Another church in Archangel served the 
spiritual needs ofthe many merchants and mariners who flocked 
there annually during the trading season, as well as others in the 
lively commercial centers of Nizhnii Novgorod and Astrakhan, 
on the Volga.35 The only restriction I have encountered on public 
Protestant worship in Russia in this period applies to the subjects 
ofthe Swedish monarch, who were forbidden from erecting their 
own church and assembling there for worship, according to the 
terms ofthe Treaty of Stolbovo (1617), which ended years of hos­
tilities between Russia and Sweden connected to the Time of 
Troubles.36 Like the Catholics, this group o f foreigners was 
restricted to practicing their faith in private. The wounds of war 
and occupation still raw, the prohibition is not surprising; nor is it 
as severe as it might first appear given the existence of other 
Protestant churches in some ofthe most important trading cities 
o f Russia that were open to all foreigners.
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As one historian noted, “the Russians somehow never learned 
to hate Protestantism quite so much as they did the Church of 
Rome.”37 Unlike Catholicism and Catholics, which, like steppe 
Islam and Muslims, were perceived as threatening by both the 
Muscovite state and the Russian Orthodox Church, Protestants, 
as distasteful as their faith was to the Russians, were regarded as 
relatively benign, like the non-Christian “small peoples” o fthe  
north. They were not associated with proselytizing, Jesuits, or 
Catholic Poland, but rather with territories—England, the Uni­
ted Provinces, northern German principalities and commercial 
centers—at the cutting edge of mining, metallurgy, weapons 
manufacture, military technique, and international trade, all key 
components o f any successful state-building project. Moreover, 
Muscovite policy since Ivan’s time had been to court the support, 
whether military/political or monetary, of Protestant powers (for 
instance England, Sweden, and Denmark) in the ongoing strug­
gle against Catholic Poland. On several occasions, these efforts 
to secure Protestant favor and assistance involved possible 
marriage alliances with the Muscovite dynasty.38 The undeniable 
and preponderantly Protestant contribution, real or potential, to 
Muscovite state objectives helped to ensure that Protestants in 
Russia, more so than Catholics, would generally be indulged with 
considerable latitude in matters of faith.
The Western European Model of Religious Intolerance
Valerie Kivelson’s insightful reflections on the Muscovite imperial 
project in Siberia bring nuance to the story o fthe  Russian con­
quest of Siberia by arguing convincingly that, while eschewing a 
“concerted missionizing campaign” among the pagan population 
of this perceived “El Dorado,” the Russians nevertheless regarded 
their Orthodox Christian presence and church-building activity in 
Siberia—“Christianizing the landscape” rather than the people— 
as God’s work.39 However, as godly as the Muscovites might have 
imagined their actions in Siberia, the fact remains that they tolera­
ted paganism in a Christian state. Fiscal concerns prevailed over 
religious zeal.
37 Florinsky, Russia, 1:273.
38 Kurilo, Ocherkipo istoriiLiuteran, 33-35. For example, in the final years 
preceding his death, Tsar Michael was negotiating a possible marriage 
between his daughter and Prince Waldemar of Denmark.
39 Kivelson, Cartographies ofTsardom, 149-170.
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Far removed from the age and the relationship that people 
and rulers had with religious faith, we mightview the Russian 
approach as obvious. It was not But for a few exceptions, through­
out Europe in the same period, religious fervor and intolerance 
were the norm even when it would have been economically more 
expedient to practice toleration. A few examples suffice to show 
that this was so. A case in point is Denmark, where, despite official 
pronouncements recognizing the economic utility o f welcoming 
foreigners into the realm, successive governments from the 16th 
century on banned non-Lutherans from settling in Denmark, ba­
nishing many and threatening those who sought to surreptitiously 
stay (as well as those who harbored them) with execution. A per­
sistent “preoccupation with confessional issues” undermined the 
mercantilist policies pursued by the government of Christian IV in 
the early 17th century, a central component of which was the re­
cruitment of Dutch, that is, non-Lutheran, specialists in mining and 
metallurgy as well as weapons manufacture, fields crucial to 
both economic/industrial development and state-building. In 1607, 
Danish recruiters were authorized to promise interested parties 
freedom of religion in Denmark, but a second drive a decade later 
withheld religious rights. Denmark thus reverted to the old status 
quo, requiring all foreigners who wished to settle in the realm to 
pass an examination administered by lay and church officials pro­
ving their adherence to the Lutheran faith.40
Throughout the German expanse in the same period, in­
stances of tolerance were “very meagre,” “ad hoc,” and unstable, 
liable to collapse at the whim o f changing circumstances. This 
situation prevailed even in commercial centers whose life-blood 
depended on the activities and resources of a multiplicity of indi­
viduals and groups, whether Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Jew or 
other, including trading diasporas long active in these commercial 
settings. Pragmatic secular authorities in many of these cities did 
attempt to accommodate the various faiths offoreigners to some 
degree, but their efforts were stiffly resisted by the clergy and bore 
limited fruit, and this only after several generations of struggle 41 
Lutheran Hamburg, for instance, a declining Hanse town anxious 
to recapture some of its former prosperity, drew growing numbers 
of Italian Catholics, Sephardi Jews, and Dutch Calvinists in the 16th
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century whose wealth and skills served as valuable economic sti­
muli. Despite the obvious benefits they had to offer, the opposition 
ofthe Hamburg Church worked to stem the flow ofthese groups 
by denying them the right to public worship (finally attained by non- 
Lutheran Christians in 1785 and by Jews only in 1849) and attempt­
ing to expel them from Hamburg entirely into the 17th century. 
Nonetheless, sustained secular resistance to these efforts helped 
maintain the foreign presence, which contributed to transforming 
Hamburg into the most important German commercial center by 
the beginning o fthe  18th century. Cologne, by contrast, which 
remained staunchly intolerant, wallowed in economic decline and 
stagnation, the obvious benefits of religious toleration—even of a 
limited nature—provided by Hamburg notwithstanding.42
Larger polities with a substantial and highly developed mer­
chant class and a strong appreciation ofthe centrality of trade to 
fiscal health and overall economic prosperity (not to mention social 
order) also balked on the issue o f religious freedom.The Dutch 
Republic, for instance, long held up as a “haven of toleration” in the 
17th century, was much less liberal than once thought. Catholics in 
the newly forming Calvinist state in the late 16th century were 
denied the right to assemble for worship, either privately or pub­
licly, while non-Calvinist Protestants, although not excessively 
molested by the secular authorities, were staunchly opposed, 
thwarted, and pressured by church leaders at least until the mid- 
17th century in a long “uphill battle” for religious liberty.43 Portu­
guese Jews fleeing the Spanish Inquisition, many with substantial 
financial resources and commercial contacts that could clearly 
help the Dutch in their state-building project and ongoing struggle 
with the Hapsburgs, attempted to establish themselves in Amster­
dam, Rotterdam, and several other commercial centers o fthe  
United Provinces. Although anxious to tap into their resources and 
networks, as was pointedly evident in negotiations with Jewish 
leaders, in the end, the Dutch proved unable to accommodate 
Jewish merchants and entrepreneurs on the religious question. 
At first insistent on restricting worship to the private sphere, 
Dutch authorities did eventually relent and allow public worship, 
but only if a minimum number of “distinguished families” settled 
(30 in Rotterdam, 50-100 in Haarlem), which effectively under­
Whaley, Religious Toleration, 6-11,206.
43 Pettegree, “Politics o f Toleration,” 182,185-198.
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mined the right in practice. By the second decade ofthe 17th cen­
tury, the law also allowed for the segregation of Jewish communi­
ties at the discretion o f municipal authorities, sternly warned 
against “corrupting” Christian servants to Judaism, and imposed 
the death penalty on Jews who had sexual relations with, or 
married, Christians.44
In England, Catholics, Calvinists, and sectarian Protestants not 
approved by the Church of England all faced an official policy that 
relentlessly sought to impose religious uniformity. Under Elizabeth I 
and her Stuart successor James I, a slew of “hard and unforgiving” 
recusancy bills were issued, aimed at suppressing Catholicism, 
even at the private level, while sectarians, who poisoned the social 
order with the evil of heterodoxy, were ruthlessly suppressed.45 
Since the Middle Ages, English state policy welcomed, even en­
couraged, the trade, entrepreneurial activities, and settlement of 
foreigners in England, first accepting Germans associated with the 
Hanseaswell as Italians from the more economically, financially, 
and technologically advanced city-states ofthe South. Later centu­
ries saw a growing influx o f individuals from the Low Countries 
and France. Some sought economic gain in commerce, the trades, 
or banking, while others (Dutch Calvinists, French Huguenots), 
especially under Elizabeth I, fled religious persecution at the hands 
of Catholics on the continent46 The flow of Protestant refugees, 
many of whom were highly skilled, wealthy, and networked, grew 
dramatically in the second half ofthe 16th century and was a boon 
for a state that was industrially backward in key sectors such as 
arms manufacture and metal extraction, as well as dangerously 
dependent on foreign (read: hostile, Catholic) sources for specie. 
That foreigners represented a “potent economic force” was not 
lost on Elizabeth and many of her policy-makers, nor was the fact 
that these invaluable human resources could only be kept in Eng­
land securely and for an extended time by indulging them with 
religious freedom 47 The strength ofthese realizations notwith­
standing, England awarded religious rights grudgingly and with 
important restrictions. Under Elizabeth and her successors, Pro­
testant foreigners were officially permitted to worship publicly in
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“stranger churches,” but had to endure persistent pressure by the 
authorities to join local English parishes. They also had to cede ulti­
mate authority in their religious affairs to the Bishop of London, 
adapt their rites and ceremonies to the English model, and even­
tually adopt the English Prayer Book and give up the use of their 
native languages during religious services.4 Moreover, these com­
munities endured increasingly intrusive official enquiries concern­
ing their persons and religious beliefs from 1561 on, when munici­
pal censuses or surveys of resident aliens, particularly in London, 
were introduced 49
The Sway of Eurasia and the Imprint of Empire
While Muscovite actions aimed at suppressing Islam in the Volga 
region in the 16th and 17th centuries mirror the age’s drive towards 
religious uniformity in the wider European space in the interests of 
moral order, social harmony, and national security, its willingness 
to tolerate, even preserve (at least for a time), the pagan spiritual 
beliefs and practices ofthe Siberian natives under Russian control 
does not—nor does its religious policy vis-a-vis the growing num­
ber of Europeans settling in Russia in these years. Although the 
parameters ofthe religious freedom accorded them by the Musco­
vites did vary, both Protestants and Catholics, the latter increasing­
ly suspect because ofthe Polish/Jesuit connection, lived, worked, 
and worshipped in early modern Russia relatively unmolested. As 
far as we know, until the early 1650s, when young Tsar Alexis was 
heavily influenced by a group of hyper-zealous, xenophobic Or­
thodox hierarchs, nobody was pressured to abandon their faith 
for Orthodoxy, or harassed by officials on the basis of religious 
conviction.50 Like the Siberian pagans, the Europeans were useful 
to Russian strategic interests, and in a much larger and substantial 
variety of ways, from bolstering revenues and quickening the flow 
of specie to a mine-deficient state, to establishing new industries 
and modernizing an outmoded army in a traditionally hostile and 
belligerent environment. But,as the quickoverview of European 
religious intolerance above demonstrates, the mere usefulness of 
a religious minority was not sufficient to ensure that it would be
Pettegree, Foreign Protestant Communities, 131,295.
49 Yungblut, Strangers, 87, 89.
50 On the “Zealots of Piety,” in particular, their relationship with Aleksei, 
see Pascal, Awakum, 35-73 and passim; and Longworth, Alexis, 31-35, 
54-61,68-91.
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admitted into a given territory or allowed to practice its faith, publicly 
or privately, in the early modern era. From this perspective, Mus­
covy stands out as a striking exception to the prevailing model.
If we shift our focus from the context of a Western European 
culture o f slowly but steadily emerging national states with their 
stark intra-Christian dichotomies, struggling bitterly againstthe col­
lapse ofthe once unifying force ofLatin Christendom, to the ethni­
cally and religiously diverse spaces under Ottoman and Mughal 
rule, we see that the Muscovite ability to place practical considera­
tions above religious anxieties and spiritually inclined motivations 
aligns neatly with the pragmatic imperial strategies employed in 
culturally mixed settings. Across this vast Eurasian space, criss­
crossed for centuries by caravans, trading diasporas, and other 
migrating communities, the landscape was rich with peoples, lan­
guages, religious beliefs and practices: a panoply of difference 
embedded in the region for millennia that forged an “appreciation 
o f unfamiliar values.”51 Prejudices and animosities between 
groups, awareness of the “other” certainly existed,52 but the cul­
tural melange was too ancient, too common, and the recognition 
ofthe harm xenophobic actions could cause to trading emporia 
too generalized to be attacked or challenged by exclusionist poli­
cies unless economic or political necessity demanded it.53 In this 
world, imperial integrity was best assured and promoted not by 
the single-minded pursuit of religious uniformity, but by differential 
religious policies tailored to specific groups and contingencies. 
Thus, while the Islamic faith ofthe Mughals inclined them towards 
intolerance ofthe polytheistic Hinduism practiced by the majority
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of their subjects, it did not prevent Mughal rulers from allowing 
Hindus to practice their religion, although the degree to which 
they could do so varied from reign to reign, depending on the per­
ceived expediency o fthe  policy at a particular point in time.54 
Further, the Mughals did not interfere with the religious life of non- 
Muslim aliens, for instance Western Europeans, Catholic and Pro­
testant alike, who established trading operations and settlements 
in their territory in the 16th and 17th centuries.55 In the Ottoman 
Empire in the same period, religious freedom for both subjects and 
stranger communities was extensive, underthe dual influence of 
the “egalitarianism and inclusive traditions of Central Asia and the 
religious tolerance of Islam.” Muslims, Christians, and Jews were 
all “People ofthe Book” according to Muslims. As such, all three 
groups were permitted to practice their religions freely. Asserting 
Muslim superiority in theory, the Ottomans simultaneously dis­
played a “near absolute but effective disregard” for difference, 
religious or other, creating an inclusive environment where “the 
various religions, ethnicities, and aliens within the empire co­
existed and co-mingled virtually at will.”56
Shaped by the dual heritage ofthe polyphonous and pantheis­
tic medieval Rus' and ofthe Tatar Golden Horde that succeeded 
it, for centuries a space settled, inhabited, visited, and ruled by a 
host of peoples—pagan, Christian, Muslim, European, and Asian— 
and straddling East and West culturally, economically, and political­
ly, the emerging empire of Muscovy in the 16th and 17th centuries 
was a world of many worlds, past and present. It was a universe 
where, decidedly more like Asia than Europe, diversity was not 
just accepted, but as Kivelson observes, expected.57 In this cultu­
rally fragmented environment, the pursuit o f religious uniformity 
was not an obvious course, at least not as far as the non-Russian 
populations, indigenous or alien, were concerned. In early modern 
Western Europe, religious toleration could be used as an instru­
ment promoting economic or political ends, but much more fre­
quently and systematically, it served as a weapon of persecution 
in the name ofthe one true faith or church. In Muscovite Russia, 
the inverse was true. While the instrumentality of toleration could
Srivastava, Great Mughals, 82-87.
55 Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade, 129-132; and Arasaratnam, “Indian Com­
mercial Groups,” 44.
56 Goffman, Ottoman Empire, 9,15,46-47,170-171,186-187.
57 Kivelson, Cartographies ofTsardom.
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go either way, it tended towards pragmatism, rather than religious 
fervor. The ethno-cultural foundation of diversity embedded in the 
Eurasian expanse of which Russia was a part coupled with a prac­
tical approach to rule characteristic of imperial strategies combined 
and reinforced each other. The result was a flexible framework 
within which the supremacy o f Orthodox Christianity was pro­
claimed and enforced among the core Russian population, an 
elastic policy o f religious toleration was applied to conquered 
peoples and resident aliens, and state interests, particularly in the 
fiscal and military spheres, were vigorously pursued, all simulta­
neously.
Had the Reformation and the counter-movement it spawned 
not been as peripheral to Russia as they were, the picture might 
well have been different, at least as far as the toleration shown to 
Catholics and Protestants was concerned. Developments in the 
neighboring kingdom o f Poland-Lithuania, the largest state in 
Europe at the time, are instructive. Like Russia, the 16th-century 
Polish-Lithuanian state was home to many peoples, Slavic (Poles, 
Ukrainians, Belarusians) and other (Armenians, Jews, Germans, 
Tatars, Roma), as well as religions. Religious diversity here was 
“prolix,” including “all the religious beliefs known in Europe”— 
Catholics, Orthodox, Armenian Christians, Lutherans, Calvinists, 
Czech Brethren, Antitrinitarians, Mennonites, Judaizing Christians, 
Jews, Muslims, and pagans; all were represented. And, in the 
inclusive traditions of Eurasia, at whose westernmost extremity 
the “Catholic” kingdom stood, the religious beliefs and practices 
o f many o f these groups were tolerated, at least in practice, 
according to limits and arrangements worked out locally with 
secular and religious authorities.58 The struggles triggered by the 
Reformation, however, and the aggressiveness ofthe Counter­
Reformation in a polity with exceptionally strong and longstanding 
ties to Rome proved too strong a force for the regional inclination 
towards pragmatic religious toleration—evident in Muscovy and 
buttressed there by the dictates o f empire to survive. By the first 
half o f the 17th century, during the “new wave of intolerance” 
sweeping across Europe, religious pluralism in Poland-Lithuania 
was extinguished.59
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In Sweden, not part o fthe  Inner Eurasian world, but close 
enough to its western extremities to be influenced by it, the oppo­
site prevailed. For centuries, Swedes, Poles, and Russians had 
waged war on each other in the Baltic’s waters and hinterland for 
control o f land, ports, and trade routes, vying for regional supre­
macy. Each warily eyed the other’s every move, assessing the 
potential impact of neighboring developments on its position and 
options.60 Christianized relatively late, never as fully integrated into 
the medieval church or Latin Christendom as other European 
states, Sweden was a weakly Catholicized space where the lurk­
ing presence o f paganism was the greatest concern to local 
churchmen when the Reformation started in the 16th century. 
Situated on “the far edge of Christendom” with a church whose 
“pulse beat sluggishly,” the lack of Catholic vigor on the one hand, 
and a correspondingly passionless, “tortuous” Reformation on the 
other, Sweden vacillated, “remarkably indecisive in religion, dither­
ing between Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Catholicism.”61 More im­
portantly for our purposes, the religious vacuum gave Swedish 
rulers a freer hand than most others in the period on the reli­
gious question, allowing them, like the Muscovites whom they 
watched so closely, to use religious toleration to further state 
interests. Although the subject requires fuller research, one could 
argue that the active, sustained Muscovite drive from the end of 
the 15th century to bring skilled foreigners to Russia to help 
strengthen the state by, among other policies, beefing up the mili­
tary and modernizing arms production and supply, was one ofthe 
factors inducing successive Swedish monarchs to pursue a simi­
lar strategy from the 1550s on.
Beginning with Gustav Vasa (1521-1560), who laid the founda­
tions ofthe mercantilist policies that helped shape the “economic 
and political conditions for Sweden’s emergence as a European 
power in the early seventeenth century,” Sweden periodically sent 
recruiters to German territories, England, orthe United Provinces, 
and especially aggressive efforts were made in the 1590s and sub­
sequent decades.62 In these years, Sweden and Russia were both
60 Useful discussions of relations in the region include Attman, Baltic Mar­
kets; Roberts, Early Vasas; Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus; Floria, Russko- 
pol'skie otnosheniia; Shaskol'skii, Stolbovskii mir, and Porshnev, Tridtsati- 
letniaia voina
61 Roberts, Early Vasas, 59-62; and Grell, “Exile and Tolerance,” 173-174.
62 Grell, “Exile and Tolerance,” 175-179.
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after the same kind of people, the same kind of skills, and, most 
probably in some cases, the very same individuals. To effectively 
compete with Russia for these valuable human resources, given 
the great wealth, and, therefore, wooing power, ofthe Muscovite 
purse and the tolerant attitude of Russian rulers on the issue of 
faith, Sweden needed to make its pitch to foreigners as attractive 
as possible. Given the Muscovite factor, to have denied desperate­
ly needed foreigners religious freedom would have undercut the 
entire project. Consequently, foreigners who settled in Sweden in 
this period were accorded religious rights, in some cases forma­
lized in writing, provided they were of the “Evangelical” (i.e. Pro­
testant) faith, and were even assisted by the authorities in the con­
struction of houses of worship and provision of preachers.63 The 
flexibility on the religious question afforded Swedish rulers by the 
weakly developed religious identity of both church and state and 
by an internally muted Reformation made it possible for Sweden 
to adopt the model of tolerance provided by Muscovy. And Mus­
covy was a concern—with the steady expansion of its territorial 
and revenue base through conquest as well as its rapidly deve­
loping White Sea trade, and the increasing centralization o f its 
state apparatus, it projected growing, ominous strength. To coun­
ter it and project Sweden onto the European stage, all weapons 
were necessary, including the age’s most cynical: religious tolera­
tion. In turn, the dynamic of competition or “emulation” inherent in 
the state system could not but further bolster the existing Musco­
vite paradigm.64
Concluding Remarks
“It is quite obvious,” observed one scholar, “that the creation of 
pluralistic orders was generally unwelcome in the age of confes- 
sionalism.”65 Throughout Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
both native and alien populations endured the consequences of 
an almost universal, often violently aggressive drive by secular 
and spiritual authorities towards religious uniformity, be it o f a 
Catholic or Protestant (Anglican, Lutheran, or Calvinist) face. Ironi­
cally, only on the easternmost fringes ofthe continent, the “back­
ward” backyard of Europe, was religious pluralism a possibility. In
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Muscovite Russia, Orthodox Christianity, the religion o fthe rulers 
and core Russian population, was practiced side by side with 
Siberian paganism as well as Catholicism and Protestantism, in all 
its varieties, in a space traversed and cohabited by innumerable 
peoples for millennia. In this environment, cultural diversity and 
religious heterogeneity were familiar and, except in the isolated 
case ofthe Muscovite attack on Islam, essentially non-threatening 
to Russian rulers. The exigencies ofthe emerging Russian empire 
in the second half ofthe 16th century, as under the Ottomans and 
the Mughals in the same period, only strengthened the largely 
laissez-faire Russian approach to the issue of religious freedom. 
Much more so than in the evolving national or culturally homoge­
neous states of Europe, “the pragmatics ofsecularized power poli­
tics” and the awareness of “the dysfunctional as well as functional 
aspects o f intolerance,”66 resonated sharply in imperial spaces 
faced with the formidable challenge of effectively holding together 
and exploiting a melange of territories and peoples that were not 
naturally or necessarily connected otherwise, all with very limited 
resources or coercive options.
The dual influences of Eurasian cultural diversity and the real- 
politik of imperial rule provided solid bed rock for relatively broad 
religious toleration in Russia in the interests ofthe early modern 
state-building project In an age of intolerance, the foundation was 
solid enough to withstand the tremors ofthe Counter-Reformation, 
which shook with increasing force the western borderlands that 
separated Orthodox Muscovy from Catholic Poland, reaching 
within the tsar’s realm itself by the first half ofthe 17th century. 
Intimately associated with Rome, culturally and dynastically linked 
for centuries to Latin Christendom, and thus part o fthe  larger 
European battleground pitting Catholicism against the evil forces 
o f Protestantism, Poland ultimately succumbed to the Western 
European paradigm of religious intolerance. By the first half ofthe 
17th century, the sway of Eurasia ceded to the pull ofthe Counter­
Reformation. From this perspective, Muscovy’s place in the Ortho­
dox rather than Catholic world and the peripheral impact of the 
Reformation in Russia added another layer o f support to the 
“liberal” Russian attitude towards religious pluralism. Similarly, the 
limp hold of Catholicism in neighboring Sweden, at the far northern 
edge of Europe, and its relatively fuss-free Reformation allowed 
rulers there to act along much the same lines as their Muscovite
66 Scribner, “Preconditions,” 43.
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counterparts in pursuit o fthe  same secular, state-oriented goals, 
with startlingly successful results by the mid-17th century.
Over a century ago, the Russian historian A. Pypin underlined 
the dichotomy between the apparent xenophobic bent of Musco­
vite culture and a purposeful official effort over time to bring Wes­
tern Europeans to Russia. More recent scholarship too has noted 
“the disconnect,” the “conflicting claims of raison d ’etat and Mus­
covite traditional culture,” and the contradiction between popular 
and religious attitudes and state needs.67 As hostile and suspicious 
as they might have been towards Catholics and Protestants, the 
Muscovites, at least those who ruled, understood with growing 
clarity that the West had much to offer Russia to help it survive 
geopolitically and even dominate. While 19th-century Slavophiles 
liked to downplay the extent and importance of the West’s contri­
bution to Russia, the Muscovites knew which course to take. As 
Pypin put it, had they denied the necessity of Western know­
ledge, skills, and assistance, they would have been guilty of no 
less than “national treason.”68 Fortunately for Russia’s policy­
makers they operated in a milieu that afforded them, unlike most 
oftheir European counterparts, the luxury o f tolerating more than 
one religion and o f adopting differential religious policies to suit 
specific groups at specific junctures.
In light of Muscovy’s long-standing tradition of cautious tole­
rance and its successful contribution in one way or another to 
Muscovite advances in numerous spheres, particularly those con­
nected to the vital areas o f technology and the military, state 
actions against Western Europeans impinging on their religious 
life, first in the early 1640s and more dramatically a decade later, 
are incongruous. 9 Muscovite deviation from the paradigm of
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67 Pypin, “Inozemtsy,” 255-256; Baron, “Moscow’s Nemeckaja Slobo- 
da,” 17; and Hughes, “Foreigners,” 4.
68 Pypin, “Inozemtsy,” 256.
69 In 1643, a decree was issued ordering the destruction of the Protes­
tant churches in Moscow. Shortly thereafter, permission was given for the 
resumption of public Protestant worship, but only in churches erected 
beyond the city core. In 1653 foreigners were accused of, and tried for, 
sorcery and “profaning” the Orthodox religion, harassed by the authorities 
for keeping Russian Orthodox servants in their employ, and threatened 
with the confiscation oftheir landed property if they did not convert to 
the Russian faith. These actions culminated in the famous expulsion ofthe 
Western European community from Moscow and the establishment of 
the “Foreign Quarter” outside the city. For details, see Baron, “Moscow’s 
Nemeckaja Sloboda,” 8-17.
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toleration, under the influence of “spiritual activists” who were im­
pelled, in Weberian terms, to construct “a community of faith and 
a common ethical way of life”70 at the possible expense ofWes- 
tern expertise, wealth, and connections—and on the eve of a new 
showdown with Poland in the shadow of a now powerhouse 
Sweden to boot—was neither an obvious norinevitable develop­
ment. That such an uncharacteristic and risky path would be 
adopted, that the “eschatological moment” as Scribner observed 
it time and time again, in Europe during the Reformation71 would 
effect a shift in the rulership’s traditional, secular-oriented percep­
tion of state interests, is not easily explained. It is this disconnect 
more than any other that needs to be addressed by scholars.
Scribner, “Preconditions,” 43.
Ibid.
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